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"STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES"
1.

How should the value of property awarded to parties be

determined.

Should fair value of property awarded in the case

be Market value or distress, give away value.
2.

Should the Plaintiff receive his cash inheitance of $8100.00

plus interest occurred.
3.

In the form it was received and kept.

Did the Plaintiff have sufficient time to do discovery

and prepare for trial.
4.

Were there excessive attorney fees granted to the

Defendants attorney.
5.

Should the defendants attorney be able to change the Pre-

trail and Memorandum Decision add the requirement of the
Plaintiff to pay One-half property taxes and insurance.
6.

Can the defendant adjust her income to affect out come.

7.

Were the defendant#s hidden assets considered in the

judgement.
8.

Who should be granted grounds for divorce the Plaintiff or

Defendant.
9.

Does the Plaintiff have .equal rights in selecting

distribution of assets.
10.

Should the Plaintiff be able to inventory the martial

assets.
11.

Was the Plaintiff given fair and equatable treatment without

prejudice when he represented himself in court.
12.

Should the Defendant be awarded permanent alimony, if so how

long, and how much.

"DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS"

Constitutional provisions are should sexual discrimination
occur in divorce proceedings, and should distribution of
assets, attorney fees, equal opportunity legal representation,
and alimony be discriminatory.
Can an individual has equal justice and fair trial
regardless of sex.

-2-

"STATEMENT OF THE CASE"

The nature of the case is Civil action of divorce filed by
the Plaintiff.

The parties experience difficulties throughout

their relationship with the Defendant causing verbal and physical
abuse.

The abuse got so excessive and happen so often that r.he

Plaintiff filed for divorce.
This case has from the start been drawn out and unnecessary
length of time. With the counsel and the defendant delaying
to resolve of the matter through causing excessive attorney fees
being generated at the expense of the plaintiff.

To the extent

that the plaintiff was bombed out of proper legal counsel.
The defendant's counsel has made outrageous demands of
settlement from the start of the case.

Therefore making an

unworkable reasonable settlement.
Alimony settlement offers were made by the Plaintiff on
several occasions up to $100 for 2 years.
The Plaintiff did disclose all assets to his attorney and in
documents provided to Defendant's attorney did show marital
funds.
The matter came forth for trial on 27, September, 1988. At
the pretrial conference date 26th of September, 1988 the Court
allowed William R. Russell, Attorney for the Plaintiff, to
withdraw from representation.

-3-

During the trial the Plaintiff objected to the following,
attorney fees for the Defendant, awarding the Camper to the
Plaintiff, excessive value of tools etc, the form of inheritance
money was to be awarded, alimony and amount.
The disposition of the trial court was granting the
defendant $200 a month alimony, requiring the Plaintiff pay 1/2
of property taxes and insurance on the marital house, the
defendant awarded $6800.00 attorneys fees, distribution of
inherited proceeds to the Plaintiff in the amount of $8100.00 v.as
in the form of property not cash, and the Court adopted Exhibit
17-D in the division of property.
The property settlement was forty per-cent for the
Plaintiff and Sixty per-cent for the Defendant.

"SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT"

Personal Property should be valued by the same method
market value for the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
The $8100.00 plus interest inheritance should be separate
property and not considered in property settlement.
The Plaintiff should have had equal opportunity and
sufficient time to do discovery work and prepare for trial.
The excessive attorney fee's generated by the Defendant's
Counsel should be denied because this kind of case does not
justify them and the Defendant and her attorney created most the
fees.

The Defendant was responsible for the Divorce.

The requirement that the Plaintiff pay 1/2 of property :.axes
and insurance, goes against the pretrial hearing and Memorandum
Decision.
Alimony of $200. Month life time is excessive of the
equalization of income method, and discrimination against the
oppose sex.
be upheld.

The new law's standards of self-sufficiency should
She is capable of being self-sufficient and

independent.

Society doesnft tolerate that from any of us. She

has the same obligations to take care of herself as we all have.
The Plaintiff should be granted the divorce if he had
sufficient grounds since he more grounds for divorce. Acts
constituting cruel conduct sufficient to cause great mental
distress to the husband justify grounds.

-5-

Plaintiff should have had equal rights in choosing personal
property.
Plaintiff should be able to inventory personal property
without it his rights were not protected.
All persons should be given same fair, and equable
treatment.

Without prejudice in the*Courts regardless of weather

he is represented by an attorney or not.

-6-

"ARGUMENT"
My opinion is that all marital property should be valued by
the same method.

Either at market value or replacement value.

In regards to the division of property should have been twothirds for the Plaintiff and one-third for the Defendant as
assumption is that the property really belongs to the husband
because he was the one who really earned it.
(1987) (61 p31)

Talley v Talley

The Plaintiff should have received $8100 plus interest in
cash as the funds was received in that form and remained there
since receiving it. Any change of type of how it was held done
before filing for divorce.

The Plaintiff should not be held

accountable inheritance money and as secreting funds as they were
not marital assets.
The Plaintiff should have had equal opportunity and
sufficient time to do discovery work to prepare for trial.
Through-out the case excessive attorney fees have been
generated by the Defendant's counsel.
unnecessary discovery work,
etc.

For example; long

numerous telephone calls and letters

When the Defendant took the camper jacks off of the

recreational vehicle and claimed the Plaintiff took them off,
approximately $300 in attorney fee's were generated.

Argument

over whose money was used to pay for the Camper purchased in
1984.

-7-

How much was paid for the truck purchased in 1986, and
where it came from.

The Defendant assaulted the Plaintiff and

then claimed he started it generating more attorney fee's of
approximately $300.

Calculated by the attorney Mr. Dyer from the

start to misrepresent the facts and set the stage to get all
attorney fee's he could assuring the Defendant that the Plaintiff
would be paying most or all attorney fee's he build up fee's.
Padding and misrepresentation of amounts, time, and
expenses.
The Pre-trail and memorandum Decision was changed by the
Defendants attorney requiring the Plaintiff to pay 1/2 of
property taxes and insurance.
therefore has no mortgage.

The marital house is paid for and

The Plaintiff has paid Property taxes

and insurance the last two years with no compensation from the
Defendant.

Granting these terms puts an unfair burden upon ~he

Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff is paying out monthly payments to live

outside the marital home.
Mortgage free.

While the Defendant lives in the horr.e

With the Defendant using the Plaintiff assets

without any compensation or benefits.
but denied.

An objection was raised

The equity share of the spouse who does not have the

presale use of the home should accrue interest at a reasonable
rate because not using his investment.
p49)

-8-

Eames v Eames (1987) (55

The Defendant reduced her piece rate income to affect the
out come of the proceedings.

In regards to determine the amount

of alimony, it should determined by previous gross income for the
year if the equalization income method is used.
The new law's standards of self-sufficiency should be upheld.
She is capable of being self-sufficient and independent.

She

cannot sit back and collect $200.00 per month for the rest of her
life.

Society doesn't tolerate that from any of us.

we are all employed.
of herself as we

That's why

She has the same obligation's to take care

all have.

The Plaintiff believes the Defendant had hidden assets -hat
were not declared, that would have affected distribution of
assets.
The Plaintiff had more grounds for divorce, being he was
subjected to verbal and physical abuse all throughout the
marriage and was the reason he filed for divorce.
Plaintiff had more grounds for divorce.

Therefore the

Acts constituting cruel

conduct sufficient to cause great mental distress need not be
aggravated and more severe when directed toward the husband than
when directed toward the wife.

Hansen v. Hansen. (1975) (537 p

2d 491)
The Plaintiff should have equal rights in choosing type and
what form of martial assets.

-9-

The Plaintiff should have been able to inventory the martial
assets because it had been 2 years since he lived at the
residence and took very little of assets with him in the
separation.
The Plaintiff feels that he was not given fair, equable
treatment and without prejudice when he represented himself in
Court.

He feels he should have equal access to the Courts

without prejudice even though he is not an attorney.

-10-

"Conclusion"

1.

The Plaintiff feels that the Martial property should be

valued at market value, and receive a greater share of martial
assets.
2.

The Plaintiff

also should receive his cash inheritance of

$8100 plus occurred interest of approximately $1000.

And not to

have it considered in the marital assets to be distributed in any
way the Defendants attorney wants it to be.
3.

Plaintiff should be allowed to do discovery work.

The

previous attorney he employed did not do sufficient discovery,
and what information the Defendant and her attorney did not
provide documents.

He should have been allowed sufficient time

to prepare for a trial and asks that these things be granted tc
ensure that he received a proper and just trial.
4.

That the excessive attorney fee's granted to the Defendant's

attorney be denied.
5.

The Plaintiff should not be required to pay any property

taxes or insurance, and the Plaintiff receive interest on his
martial investment in the home.
6.

The Defendant's hidden assets be considered in distribution

of property.
7.

That the Plaintiff be granted divorce as he had more and

proven grounds for divorce.

-11-

8.

Plaintiff should have some sort of adjustment for not being

able to inventory assets.
9.

The Plaintiff be granted an equal opportunity to decide in

distribution of property.
Therefore, Appellant respectfully requests that this case be
remanded to the District Court, over rule the Decree of Divorce.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

_/^~

da

Bert C. Davis
Appellant
6885 So. Redwood Rd. #1209
West Jordan, Utah 84084
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Y

of

March, 1989.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BERT C. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO.

D-87-3653

:

MARJORIE J. DAVIS,

:

Defendant.

:

The above-entitled matter came on for trial the 27th day of
September, 1988.

The plaintiff appeared pro se, having requested

of the Court at the pretrial settlement conference set the 26th
of

September,

1988

that

the

Court

allow

William

R.

Russell,

attorney for the plaintiff, to withdraw from representation.
Russell was present at the pretrial conference.

Mr.

The defendant

was present at pretrial and trial, and was represented-by her
attorney Phillip W. Dyer.

The Court provided the plaintiff with

substantial leeway in suspending the formal application of the
Rules of Evidence to allow the plaintiff to present his case pro
se.

Witnesses were called by both parties, and examined

cross-examined

as

appropriate.

At

the

conclusion

of

and
the

evidence, the Court heard closing arguments and took the matter
under advisement, and now renders this, its Memorandum Decision.

-A?

DAVIS V, DAVIS

1.

PAGE TWO

The plaintiff

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION

defendant have been married

just

under 27 years, having been married on the 13th of October, 1961.
At the time of the marriage the plaintiff was 2 0 years of age,
and the defendant was 15. Three children have been born as issue
of the marriage, all of whom are emancipated.
2.

The plaintiff has been employed at Kennecott Copper

Corporation
years.

for a period, according to his testimony, of 29

However, from August of 1985 to April of 1987 he was not

so employed due to a suspension of continued

operations and

furloughing of employees by the company.
3.

The defendant is employed as a seamstress for Osborne

Apparel in Magna, Utah.
4•

During

regularly.

the marriage

of the parties they vacationed

The plaintiff testified that he is entitled to five

weeks vacation annually.

They attended cultural and sporting

events, and other opportunities consistent with their income.
(5/\

The

plaintiff

is

employed,

and

earns

approximately

$1,710.00) per month gross, and the defendant is employed, earning
approximately>^865. 00 jper month gross.
6.

The plaintiff during the course of this litigation has

employed two separate attorneys, and has failed to be forthright
and candid

in either

disclosing

evaluating the case for settlement.

his assets or

realistically

The plaintiff intentionally

failed to disclose $10,100.00 which was converted into travelers

checks prior

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE THREE

DAVIS V. DAVIS

to the commencement

of this action, and through

routine discovery was not disclosed.

This caused the defendant

to engage in extensive discovery and investigation to determine
the existence of the funds.
7.

The

Court

finds

that

the

plaintiff

received

an

inheritance from his mother's estate in late 1985 in the amount
of $8,100.00, which funds were deposited into savings, and at all
times

thereafter

the parties maintained

a savings

account

in

excess of the amount of those funds.
8.

At all times during the course of the litigation the

plaintiff has maintained that he will not pay any support in the
form of alimony, and objects to any continuing order or permanent
alimony.
9.
issues.

The major contested issues are confined to three main
They are as follows:
(a)

Should an award of permanent alimony be rendered,

and if so, in what amount?
(b)

Has the $8,100.00 from the plaintiff's inheritance

from his mother been commingled into the family estate and lost
its separate identity, or should it be awarded exclusively to the
plaintiff?
(c)

Is the defendant entitled to reasonable attorney's

fees from the plaintiff as a result of the protracted nature of
the litigation?

DAVIS V. DAVIS

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

In resolving the foregoing issues, the Court hereby orders,
adjudges and decrees, as follows:
i.

The defendant is entitled to permanent alimony in the

amount of $200.00 per month.
2.

The plaintiff is entitled to the return as an equitable

distribution
($8,100.00

of

his

inherited

proceeds

in

the

amount

of

N

The defendant is entitled to payment of attorney f s fees

3.

due to the fact that the Court specifically finds the protracted
nature of this litigation was a result of the plaintiff's effort
to

secret

$10,100.00

in

cooperate with discovery
defendant

is

entitled

to

cash,

and

further

and truthfully
an award

his

respond,

failure
and

of attorney's

thus

fees

in

to
the
the

amount of $6,800.00, and Judgment may be rendered on that amount
against the plaintiff.
4.

Each

party

is

permanently

enjoined

from

harassing,

vexing, or annoying the other party in any way.
5.
considered

Further, the Court finds that other personal property
by

the

Court

for

division

should

be

divided

as

follows:
(a)

The Court adopts Exhibit 17-D as to the division

to the plaintiff and defendant of the items contained thereon.
(b)

The items on the schedule referred to during the

trial as Exhibit "A", which was attached to the Financial

DAVIS V. DAVIS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE FIVE

Declarations shall be awarded as contained on that schedule, with
the following exceptions:

The plaintiff is awarded the old

found; the-personal .books referred to as "his11 personal books;
on&Srof the federation rock cases; the iron wall picture he built;
the

three

picture.

aluminum

plaque

cars he

created;

and

the orange

All other items not specifically referred to herein are

awarded to the party in possession of said items.
The defendant's attorney is requested to prepare Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce consistent with
these

findings,

other

matters

resolved

by

agreement

or

appropriately pled, and is to prepare those Findings to indicate
that the Decree of Divorce is granted to the defendant on her
Counterclaim, since only the defendant presented evidence as to
jurisdiction and grounds.
Dated this

£p

day of October, 1988.

DAVID S. YOUNG
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
Attorney for Defendant
318 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)363-5000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BERT CHARLES DAVIS,

)

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)
)
)

MARJORIE DAVIS,

)

Civil No. D87-3653

)

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on September
27, 1988, the plaintiff appearing pro se and the defendant
appearing with her counsel, Phillip W. Dyer.

The parties

stipulated to certain matters, called witnesses, presented
evidence, testimony and exhibits, and argued the issues to
the Court.

The Court having taken the matter under

advisement and having issued its Memorandum Decision dated
October 5, 1988, and good cause appearing therefore, now
makes and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant is, and was for three (3) months prior to

the filing of her Answer and Counterclaim herein, a bona fide
1

resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife and

were married on October 13, 1961.

The parties were married

just under twenty-seven years at the time of trial.
3.

At the time of the marriage, plaintiff was twenty

(^TF^MtgB^ of J&g^ and defendant was fifteen (15) years of
age.
4.

There have been three (3) children born as issue of

the parties' marriage, all of whom were emancipated at the
time of trial.

\dN%£TT~mViG

plaiivtri^^

resddaaee* ami

dated other woHSh.
^

Plaintiff is currently employed at Kennecott Copper

Corporation and earns approximately $1,710.00 per month in
gross income.
^|.

/

J"*-

Defendant is currently employed as a seamstress for

Osborn Apparel in Magna, Utah, and earns approximately
$856.00 per month in gross income.
8.

Plaintiff has been employed at Kennecott Copper

Corporation for twenty-nine (29) years, except for the period

beginning in August 1985 through April of 1987 during which
time plaintiff was unemployed due to a suspension of
continued operations and furloughing of employees by
Kennecott Copper Corporation.

During the time plaintiff was

furloughed, he attended Salt Lake Community College and
ultimately obtained an Associate Degree from that
institution.
9.

Defendant's educational background is limited to

graduation from high school.
10.

During the parties' marriage, defendant's

employment history outside the home has been limited
exclusively to work as a seamstress at Osborn Apparel.
Otherwise, defendant was a homemaker until such time as the
parties' youngest child obtained school age.

Defendant

currently has no skills or job experience other than work as
a seamstress.
11.

Defendant is currently experiencing health problems

that require monthly prescriptions and treatment for
hypertension.

Additionally, defendant is receiving

psychological counseling for stress and related psychological
distress.

net monthly income,* after deduction for Federal and State
_ ^

v

— —. — - „

t a x e s ait* FTCX^ w i t h h c a S i ^ g 7 ^ I l $ 7 1 0 7 ^ .
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13.

Plaintiff did not present any evidence concerning

his net monthly income or his monthly expenses other than the
fact that he pays for most of his monthly expenses by cash
except for such items as rent, utilities and professional
services which he pays by check,
14.

During the parties' marriage, their lifestyle

included taking family vacations on a regular basis and
attendance at cultural activities, sports events and other
opportunities consistent with their income.

Plaintiff is

currently entitled to five (5) weeks paid vacation time on an
annual basis from his employment.
15.

At all times during the course of these

proceedings, plaintiff has asserted and maintained he will
not pay any support to defendant in the form of alimony and
objects to any continuing order of permanent alimony as being
immoral.
16.

Plaintiff received an inheritance from his mother's

estate in late 1985 in the amount of $8,100.00, which funds
were deposited into a savings account containing marital
funds.

The parties have thereafter maintained, at all times,

a savings account balance in excess of the amount of those
funds but no records were kept delineating which funds were
marital funds and which funds were inherited funds.
17.

Plaintiff is capable of paying support to defendant
4

by virtue of his income and apparent minimal expenses.
18.

During the course of this litigation, plaintiff has

employed two (2) separate attorneys, has failed to be
forthright and candid in disclosing his assets and has failed
to realistically evaluate this case for settlement.

More

specifically, the plaintiff intentionally failed to disclose
$10,100.00 that was converted into travelers' checks prior to
commencement of this action and did not disclose the funds
through routine discovery.

As a result of plaintiff's

misconduct, defendant has necessarily incurred substantial
attorney's fees and costs due to the extensive discovery and
investigation needed to determine the existence of these
funds.
19.

The defendant has outstanding attorney's fees in

the approximate sum of $6,800.00 which were necessarily
incurred by defendant to discover the funds secreted by
plaintiff and to pursue her entitlement to alimony.
20.

The Court specifically finds the attorney's fees

incurred by defendant were reasonable in the total amount
charged, the rate charged to defendant, the time spent on the
case and the complexity of the issues involved in the case.
The Court further finds that $75.00 per hour is a rate
customarily charged in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is
reflective of the parties ability to pay.
5

21.

The Court finds plaintiff is entitled to the return

of his inherited proceeds in the amount of $8,100.00 as an
equitable distribution of marital assets.
22.

The parties have a marital residence with no

mortgage or debt thereon and which is appraised at
$89,000.00.

The parties have agreed to list the home for

sale and to split the net proceeds from the sale, after
payment of all reasonable costs of sale, including but not
limited to, real estate commissions, closing costs and
points.

The parties further agreed that defendant may have

exclusive use of the marital residence until such time as the
residence is sold and defendant shall maintain said residence
at her own expense.

The parties also agreed to equally share

the real property taxes and insurance costs on said residence
until the same is sold.
23.

The plaintiff has a vested retirement with his

employer and the parties have agreed that defendant shall be
awarded one-half (1/2) of the retirement account that accrued
during the marriage with the same to be divided by issuance
to plaintiff's employer of a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code.
24.

Plaintiff has a whole life insurance policy with a

cash value of $1,500.00 and the parties agreed that defendant
shall be awarded $750.00 representing her share of the cash
6

value.
25.

The parties have experienced difficulties in

communicating with each other resulting in arguments and
altercations and each party should be permanently enjoined
from harassing, vexing or annoying the other party in any
way.
26.

The Court finds the partes have obtained the

following personal property:
Marital Assets

Value

1986 GMC Pickup Truck
Snowmobiles and Trailer
Motorcycles and Trailer
1979 Pontiac
Camper
Tools
Cash
Household Goods
TOTAL
27.

$7,850.00
900.00
1,200.00
2,500.00
4,200.00
10,000.00
10,100.00
5,000.00
$41,750.00

The Court finds that plaintiff should be awarded

the following personal property:
Asset

Value

1986 GMC Pickup Truck
Snowmobiles and Trailer
360 Honda
Camper
Tools
Cash
TOTAL

$7,850.00
900.00
300.00
4,200.00
10,000.00
1,675.00
$24,925.00

Additionally, plaintiff should be awarded the old Hawaiian
pinball machine, the brass candles and candleholders, if
found, the personal books referred to as "his" personal
7

books, one of the federation rock cases, the iron wall
picture he built, the three (3) aluminum plaque cars he
created, and the orange picture.
28.

The Court finds that defendant should be awarded

the following personal property:
Asset

Value

1979 Pontiac
Household Goods
Two Motorcycles & Trailer
Cash
TOTAL
29.

$2,500.00
5,000.00
900.00
8,425.00
$16,825.00

The Court finds that any specific items of personal

property not previously awarded in paragraphs 27 and 28
heretofore shall be divided pursuant to Trial Exhibit A, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by this reference.

Further, all items of

personal property not specifically referred to hereinabove or
on Trial Exhibit A are awarded to the party in possession of
said items.
NOW THEREFORE, the Court having made its Findings of
Fact now makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from

plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to
become final upon entry.
2.

Defendant is in need of financial assistance and
8

support from plaintiff to meet her monthly expenses and to
assist her in approaching the lifestyle to which the parties
had become accustomed during the marriage and plaintiff is
capable of financially contributing to defendant's support,
and it is fair and equitable that plaintiff should be ordered
to pay alimony to defendant in the monthly sum of $200.00.
Further, it is fair and equitable that plaintiff's obligation
to pay alimony to defendant should be a permanent order of
this Court due to the length of the marriage, the parties
respective ages at the time of the marriage, defendant's
limited education and job experience and defendant's limited
prospects for employment at a greater rate of pay.

The

foregoing order of permanent alimony is, however, subject to
all applicable provisions of law concerning modification of
the alimony award or termination of the alimony award in the
event the Court were to determine defendant violated the
provisions of U.C.A. 30-3-5(6) (1953) concerning remarriage
or residing with a person of the opposite sex or in the event
defendant died.
3.

The Court concludes it is fair and equitable that

plaintiff be awarded the inheritance he received from his
mother' estate in 1985.

The Court further concludes that it

is fair and equitable that the personal property of the
parties should be awarded as follows:
9

TO BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF:
1986 GMC Pickup Truck
Snowmobiles and Trailer
360 Honda
Camper
Tools
Cash
TOTAL

$7,850-00
900-00
300.00
4,200.00
10,000.00
1,675.00
$24,925.00

Additionally, plaintiff should be awarded the old Hawaiian
pinball machine, the brass candles and candleholders, if
found, the personal books referred to as "his" personal
books, one of the federation rock cases, the iron wall
picture he built, the three (3) aluminum plaque cars he
created, and the orange picture.
TO BE AWARDED TO DEFENDANT:
1979 Pontiac
$2,500.00
Household Goods
5,000.00
Two Motorcycles & Trailer
900.00
Cash
8,425.00
TOTAL
$16,825.00
4.

The Court concludes that the division of personal

property set forth in paragraph 3 of these Conclusions of Law
represents an equitable distribution and return of
plaintiff's inherited funds by virtue of his receiving
$8,100.00 more of the parties' personal property.
5.

It is fair and equitable that the division of

personal property shall be in accordance with paragraph 3 of
these Conclusions of Law and the remaining personal property
shall be divided pursuant to Trial Exhibit A, a copy of which
10

is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by
this reference.

Any items of personal property not divided

pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conclusions of Law or Trial
Exhibit A shall be awarded to the party in possession of said
items.
6•

It is fair and equitable that the parties agreement

concerning sale of the marital residence be approved by the
Court and the Court so approves said agreement and it should
be ordered that the parties should list the home for sale and
further should split the net proceeds from the sale, after
payment of all reasonable costs of sale, including but not
limited to, real estate commissions, closing costs and
points.

The defendant should have exclusive use of the

marital residence until such time as the residence is sold
and defendant should maintain said residence at her own
expense.

The parties should equally share the real property

taxes and insurance costs on said residence until the same is
sold.
7.

It is fair and equitable that the parties agreement

concerning plaintiff's retirement account be approved by the
Court and the Court so approves said agreement and it should
be ordered that defendant should be awarded one-half (1/2) of
plaintiff's retirement account that accrued during the
marriage with the same to be divided by issuance to
11

plaintiff's employer of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code.
8.

It is fair and equitable that the parties agreement

concerning plaintiff's life insurance policy be approved by
the Court and the Court so approves said agreement and it
should be ordered that the defendant shall be awarded $750.00
representing her share of the cash value of said life
insurance policy.
9.

The defendant has necessarily incurred attorney's

fees and costs in the sum of $6,800.00 and the foregoing
attorney's fees and costs were reasonable in amount charged
and time expended and it is fair and equitable that plaintiff
be ordered to pay $6,800.00 in attorney's fees and costs and
judgment should be entered against plaintiff in that amount.
MADE AND ENTERED this

day of

, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
District Court Judge

A-DAVIS.fin.DIV5
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Bert C. Davis
Attorney for the pi antiff
6885 So. Redwood Rd. // 1209
West Jordon, Utah 84084
565-0716

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT IK AND FOR
SAL? LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

rEPT CHARLES DAVIS,
Fie i M i f f ,

)
}
}

FRE-TFIAL ORDER

»
V£ .

KAfcJOME DAVIS,

)

Civil No. D87-3655

;

Defendant.

)

Juooe David S. Younc

)

IT IS ORDERED:
I.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDIN3S:

This is an action for dissolution of the marriage
between the parties, a division of property and award of
support.
II.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
A.

Plaintiff's Position:

Defendant should receive

temporary' alimony of $100.00 per month for one (1) year and
$50.00 per month for two (2) years thereafter, with alimony
to terminate at that point in time.

Plaintiff should be

awarded personal property as shown on Exibit A attached hereto.
Plaintiff should be oiven credit for damaaes to

personal property. Plaintiff should receive $9,200.00 of
cash on hand as inherited and separate property.
B.

Defendant's position:

Plaintiff should pay

permanent alimony of $250.oo per month.

The personal

property should be divided as shown on Exhibit B attatched
hereto with the exception of the camper which should be
awarded to plaintiff.

Defendant should be awarded judgment

against plaintiff in the sum of $8,500.00 representing onehalf (1/2) of funds plaintiff obtained and possessed during
pendency of these proceedings.
vehicles.

Each party should be awarded their respective

Tne cash value in plaintiff's life insurance policy should

be divided equally.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay defendant's

attorney's fees and costs.
III.

MATTERS AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES:

Tne parties have previously stipulated to the following matters:
1.

The marital residence located at 2660 South 8000 West

Magna, Utah, has an

appraised value of $89,000.00. The home shall

be listed for sale and the net proceeds (after deducting all costs of
sale including but not limited to points, closing costs and real estate
broker's commissions) should be divided equally.

Plaintiff shall

have exclusive use of the residence until it is sold and shall assume all

9

maintenance obligations on the residence.

The property taxes

and insurance costs on the residence shall be borne by the party that
occupies the house.
2.

The amount of plaintiff's retirement accuring during

the marriage shall be divided equally by issuance of a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code.
3.

The defendant shall be awarded $750.00 representing her

one-half (1/2) of the cash value in plaintiff's life insurance policy.
IV.

FACTS NOT TO BE CONTESTED:

The following facts are not at issue:
1. The parties have been married for approximately
twenty-seven (27) years and have three (3) adult children.
2. Plaintiff was nineteen (19) years of age and defendant
was fifteen (15) years of age at the time of marriage.

Plaintiff is

currently forty-seven (47) years of age and defendant is forty-two (42)
years of age.
3.

Plaintiff's hourly wage is $9.94 per hour.

4.

Plaintiff had $17,100.00 in traveler's checks during

these proceedings.

5.

Plaintiff currently has $10,100.00 left of the $17,100.00 in

traveler's checks.
6.

Plaintiff received and inheritance of $8,100.00 in cash in 1985.

V.

ISSUES OF FACT TO BE LITIGATED:
The following issues of facts, and no others, remain to be litigated

at trial:
1.

The ability of defendant to provide for

her support.

2.

The ability of plaintiff to provide support for defendant.

3.

Has plaintiff's inheritance been cc-mingled/lost its identity.

4. The value of the personal property of the parties.
5.

Tne necessity and reasonableness of defendant's attorneyfs fees

incurred in prosecuting/defendant this matter.
6.

The inheritance of money of defendant's cash gift to the parties,

used to purchase a 35 MM camera and accessories.
7.

Defendant's net monthly income of $710.74 is questionable and

her monthly expenses of $995.96 are also questionable.
8.

Damages done by the defendant to personal property of Plaintiff and

other person be awarded.
9
10.

Division of property.
The defendant adjustment of income since the proceedings.

4

VI. ISSUES OF LAW TO BE LITIGATED:
The following issues of law, and no others, remain to be
]itigated at trial:
1.

Should plaintiff be ordered to pay to defendant

alinony?
a.

What amount of el irony is fair and

b.

For what period of time should plaintiff

eaui table?

be required to p>ay alimony?
2.

Is plaintiff entitled to an award of inherited

property under the guidelines of Horter.sen v. Kortensen, 8S
Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah Sup. Ct. , August 36, 1586).
3.

How should the Court divide the personal

property of the parties?
4.

Should defendant*

be ordered

to pay tc plaintiff '

her attorney's fees and costs incurred herein?
The foregoing admissions, issues of facts and law shall
be binding upon the p>arties, and this Order shall supplement
the pleadings and govern the course of the trial of this
case, unless modified to prevent manifest injustice.
DATED this
day of
, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
District Court Judge

PHILLIP W. DYER (4315)
Attorney for Defendant
318 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)363-5000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BERT CHARLES DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

i
|

DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
JUDGMENT

i

Civil No. D87-3653

i

Judge David S. Young

vs.
MARJORIE DAVIS,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on September
27, 1988, the plaintiff appearing pro se and the defendant
appearing with her counsel, Phillip W. Dyer.

The parties

stipulated to certain matters, called witnesses, presented
evidence, testimony and exhibits, and argued the issues to
the Court.

The Court having taken the matter under

advisement and having issued its Memorandum Decision dated
October 5, 1988, and having heretofore made and entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Defendant is awarded a Decree of Divorce from
1

plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to
become final upon entry,
2.

The parties are ordered to list the marital

residence for sale and to split the net proceeds from the
sale, after payment of all reasonable costs of sale,
including but not limited to, real estate commissions,
closing costs and points.

The defendant is awarded exclusive

use of the marital residence until such time as the residence
is sold and defendant is ordered to maintain said residence
at her own expense.

The parties are both ordered to equally

share the real property taxes and insurance costs on said
residence until the same is sold.
3.

The plaintiff has a vested retirement with his

employer and the defendant is awarded one-half (1/2) of the
retirement account that accrued during the marriage with the
same to be divided by issuance to plaintiff's employer of a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order pursuant to the Internal
Revenue Code and defendant's counsel shall submit a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order to the Court for signature.
4.

Plaintiff has a whole life insurance policy with a

cash value of $1,500.00 and the defendant is awarded $750.00
representing her share of the cash value in said policy.
5.

The parties are both permanently enjoined from

harassing, vexing or annoying the other party in any way.
2

6.

The plaintiff is awarded the following personal

property:
Asset

Value

1986 GMC Pickup Truck
Snowmobiles and Trailer
360 Honda
Camper
Tools
Cash
TOTAL

$7,850.00
900.00
300.00
4,200.00
10f000.00
1,675.00
$24,925.00

Additionally, plaintiff is awarded the old Hawaiian pinball
machine, the brass candles and candleholders, if found, the
personal books referred to as "his" personal books, one of
the federation rock cases, the iron wall picture he built,
the three (3) aluminum plaque cars he created, and the orange
picture.
7.

The defendant is awarded the following personal

property:
Asset

Value

1979 Pontiac
Household Goods
Two Motorcycles & Trailer
Cash
^
TOTAL
^
"
8.

$2,500.00
5,000.00
900.00
^ 8,425.00
$16,825.00

Any specific items of personal property not

previously awarded in paragraphs 6 and 7 heretofore are
ordered to be divided pursuant to Trial Exhibit A, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein
by this reference.

Further, all items of personal property
3

not specifically referred to hereinabove or on Trial Exhibit
A are awarded to the party in possession of said items.
9.

The plaintiff is awarded the inheritance he received

from his mother' estate in 1985 by virtue of his receiving
$8,100.00 more of the parties' personal property.
10.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay permanemt alimony

to defendant in the monthly sum of $200.00.
11.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay $6,800.00 in

defendant's attorney's fees and costs and judgment is entered
against plaintiff in the sum of $6,800.00
DATED this

day of

, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
District Court Judge

a-Davis.dec.DIV5

MARJORIE DAVIS INCOME BASED ON 1987 NET INCOME OFF LAST YEARS PAY
NET INCOME
DIVIDED BY 12 MO.
EQUALS

* 10974. 55
12
* 914.55 PER MO.

NOTE; THIS IS NOT FOR FULL TIME HOURS WORKED.

PERT C. DAVIS INCOME BASED ON 1987 MET INCOME OFF LAST YEARS PAY
NET INCOME
$1230 PER MO. BASED ON *1137. DIVIDED BY 4
WEEKS EQUALS *2&4. TIMES 4.3 EQUALS SI230 PER MONTH.
PLAINTIFF
DEFFNDANT
DIFFERENCE

* 1230.
$ 930.
* 316.
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per year.
She had been employed during
most of the marriage in unskilled or untrained
type positions. Mr. Eames was a manufacturing engineer with Morton-Thiokol and had
worked with that corporation since 1962. His
gross income was approximately $34,000 per
year.
Because the parties placed widely
varying valuations on their items of personal
property, the trial judge made the division
without finding specific values for each item
In addition to her share of the personal property, the plaintiff received her equity in a
partnership consisting of members of her
paternal family (Five Way Partnership), previous distributions from this partnership, her
inherited property, gifts from her father, and
a one-half interest in the family home.
Plaintiff was given the right to live in the
home until February 1, 1989, or until it was
sold by agreement of the parties, whichever
came first. While in the home, Mrs. Eames
Cite as
was responsible for payment of taxes, insur55 Utah Adv. Rep. 49
ance, and mortgage installments. Defendant
received his share of the personal property, his
IN THE
separate bank account, the inheritance from
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
his parents, and an undivided one-half interest in the family home less the mortgage
Joan EAMES,
indebtedness at the time of trial. Each party
Plaintiff and Respondent,
received one-half of the other's retirement
v.
benefit, to be paid when it was received. This
Emerson EAMES,
provision was subject to the approved formula
Defendant and Appellant.
which considers the number of years worked
Before Judges Davidson, Orme and Garff
during the marriage Defendant's retirement
was vested while the plaintiffs was not, his
No. 860019-CA
being much more valuable than hers
FILED: April 9, 1987
Plaintiff was awarded alimony in the
amount of $450 00 per month so long as the
FIRST DISTRICT
youngest child successfully pursued a full time
Hon. Omer J. Call
college education, lived in the family home,
remained single, or reached the age of 21
ATTORNEYS:
years. Then alimony was reduced to $300 00
George W. Preston for Defendant and
per month and would remain so until plaintiff
Appellant.
reached the age of 65 years. At that time
Gordon J. Low for Plaintiff and Respondent.
alimony would terminate.
Defendant claims error in the distribution of
OPINION
the real and personal property of the parties
and in the award of alimony. The trial court
DAVIDSON, Judge:
has statutory authority to decree an equitable
The trial court granted a divorce to plaintiff
distribution of property in a divorce action
Joan Eames from defendant Emerson Earnes.
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1986).
The Judgment and Decree provided for a
In the case of King v. King, 111 P.2d 715
distribution of property and an award of
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court emphalimony to plaintiff. On appeal, defendant
asized that it would accord considerable defseeks a reversal of the trial court's judgment
erence to the trial court's judgment and treat
as it relates to alimony and distribution of
its findings with a presumption of validity. An
property. We affirm.
appellant has the burden of showing that the
The parties were married for thirty years
trial court's award "works such a manifest
with three children bom to the union. At the
injustice or inequity as to clearly be an abuse
time of trial in January, 1984, the youngest
of that broad discretion [in adjusting the finchild was 18 years old and resided with plaiancial needs and property interests of the
ntiff: in the family home while she 7 attended
parties]. *
college.' Defendant jiarfjmoyfed tib a f f e r e n t j
The trial 'jecord exposes tthe disparities 4n
residence: Plaintiff was employed, as a depaeducation, income," and earning potential
rtment manager and clerk for a large store and
between the parties. The record also reveals
her gross income was approximately*$10,000
that any future income from the Five Way

3. There is no indication of what disposition was
made of that charge. One Porsche, 526 P 2d at
917.
4. Without legal analysis or authority, Honda contends that One Pontiac is not controlling because
the decision post-dates the trial. We decline to
enter into a detailed analysis of this issue, State v.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984), except
to say that Honda's contention is without merit.
See Chevron Oil Co v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 10607 (1971)
For cases construing similar statutory
language see, c g . U S v One (1) 1982 28* International Vessel, 741 F 2d 1319 (11th Cir. 1984);
U S v One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th
Cir 1978), U S v One 1975 Ford Pickup Truck,
558 F2d 755 (5th Cir. 1977); Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).

r^. ~ Amn u#* n#«h Ctu\* Annotations. consult Code* Co'* Annotation Service
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Partnership will be considerably less than
defendant asserts. Defendant's claimed right
to receive interest on his one-half interest in
the home's equity for the period until February 1, 1989, is offset by the plaintiffs need
to provide shelter and support for the parties*
youngest child while she attends college. It is
presumed the trial judge took these economic
realities into consideration and, on balance, it
can be said that he strove for an equitable
distribution of the property.
A recent Utah Supreme Court opinion
concerning alimony, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d
96, 100 (Utah 1986), states that the purpose of
spousal support is to 'enable the receiving
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of lining enjoyed during the marriage
and to prevent the spouse from becoming a
public charge." The appellate courts should
not interfere with such an award without a
showing of a "clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion*. The Court in Paffel further set
forth what must be considered by the trial
court to avoid a challenge to the award as
being an abuse of discretion. These factorsare, (1) the financial condition and needs of
the spouse claiming support, (2) the ability of
that spouse to provide sufficient income for
him or herself, and (3) the ability of the responding spouse {Mr. Eames] to provide the
support. The trial record here shows that the
court below carefully and properly considered
the above factors. There was no abuse of
discretion. Therefore, the award of alimony
will not be disturbed.
v
Plaintiff requests attorney's fees on appeal.
This issue is governed by R. Utah Ct. App.
33(a) in rhat this Court may award costs and
attorney's fees to the prevailing party if we
determine the appeal to be either frivolous or
brought for delav.
The instant appeal is
without merit but the record must be examined to determine whether or not it is frivolous
or brought for delay. In Cady v. Johnson,
671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), the Court
implied the awarding of attorney's fees required a finding that the suit was lacking in good
faith and then defined "good faith" as:
(1) An honest belief in the propriety
of the activities in question;
(2) no intent to take unconscionable
advantage of others; and
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of
the fact that the activities in question will, (sic) hinder, delay or
defraud others.
The Court recognizes the right of a party to
argue in an attempt to correct what that party
deems to be error in the court below.
However, when there is no basis for the argument presented and when the evidence or law
is mischaracterized and misstated, the Court
must'Question the partyV.motives.
The
record shows the trial judge making Findings
For complete Utah Code, Aftaotatkms,

Codc*Co

of Fact, dividing the property, and awarding
support after a careful consideration of all the
evidence. Defendant ignores this. Mr. Eames
claims the trial court erred in awarding
alimony to his wife. This attempt at deprivation of alimony is contrary to the intent of Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah
1980), which was cited in defendant's brief.
Surely a wife of thirty years deserves something more than being cast adrift in the sea of
economic uncertainty without some long term
support from a husband with superior earning
potential. Defendant refuses to accept the
evidence presented concerning plaintiff's interest in the Five Way Partnership. He continues to argue that the interest is of great and
increasing value. He refuses to acknowledge
the uncontroverted evidence that past distributions resulted from the sale of assets. He
incorrectly argues for a valuation based upon
the past rather than a valuation at the time of
trial. Defendant also fails to recognize that he
was awarded his own inheritance and fails to
consider any income potential from that
source.
Defendant further misstates the law when he
argues that the alimony award cannot be
changed in the future. Utah Code Ann. §303-5 (1986) specifically reserves jurisdiction to
the trial court to "make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance
of the parties—*
The totality of defendant's argument
compels this Court to find that he is attempting to take unconscionable advantage of his
wife and that this appeal is frivolous. Therefore, it fails to meet the standards of good
faith and R. Utah Ct. App. 33(a) applies.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court,
award costs against the defendant, and
remand to the trial court for a determination
of plaintiff's attorney's fees which are
ordered to be paid by the defendant.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
I CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
ORME, Judge: (Dissenting in part)
I agree with the majority that the decision
below must be affirmed. The trial court's
disposition is well within the realm of reasonableness and no abuse of discretion has been
demonstrated. While I agree the appeal is not
well taken, I am not convinced it was frivolously taken and I dissent from the majority's
imposition of attorney's fees against defendant.
Defendant had three major gripes with the
trial court's decision. First, he did not think
any alimony should have bepi;vawarded
because- his, formex^wife ishib^
pinfulry: employed. Second?that even if some, award of»
Code*Co'f AwKKitSon Servicr

Code •Co
Provo, Utah
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appropriate, the court erred in providing that especially for a period as long as five full
alimony continue until age 65 without regard years, it is to be expected that the equity share
to the possibility of remarriage, cohabitation, of the spouse who does not have the pre-saie
or other changed circumstance. Finally, he use of the home will accrue interest at some
complained that although the trial court reasonable rate, even though that interest
awarded him 50°7o of the equity in the marital might not be payable until the sale proceeds
home, it permitted plaintiff the right to live in are available Such a provision is necessary to
the home for five years without any provision compensate the spouse who has to find somthat interest would accrue on the equity share - eplace else to live without access to his or her
- the substantial investment - he had in substantial investment which remains tied up
the home.
in his or her former home. Failure to include a
As to the first issue, the alimony awarded provision for interest would, in my judgment,
by the trial court is really on the low end of ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion
what is appropriate under the doctrine reiter- where the period during which sale is deferred
ated in Paffel in view of the parties' ages and is of more than incidental duration. Although
education, as well as the length of their mar- 1, like the majority, believe no abuse uas
riage and the substantial disparity in their committed in this particular case, chiefly
incomes. It is a modest award and defendant because the alimony award as such was quite
cannot have reasonably thought there was any meager, 1 believe defendant was entitled to our
remote possibility of it being disturbed on review of that issue to make sure this was
indeed one of those rare situations where a
appeal.
The second issue is equally frivolous. Alt- "no interest" provision would pass muster.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
hough the decree recited that alimony would
continue until defendant's former wife
reached 65 and did not expressly refer to
earlier termination upon her remarriage or
other change of circumstance, defendant's
concern is allayed by statute. Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-5(5) (1986) provides that
Cite as
unless a decree of divorce "specifically prov55 Utah Adv. Rep. 51
ides otherwise/ an award of alimony terminIN THE
ates upon remarriage.
Section 30-3-5(6)
provides that alimony also terminates upon
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
cohabitation unless the arrangement is free of
sexual contact. At oral argument, defendant Vanza Eckersley BOYLE,
asserted that his concern was that the "until
Plaintiff and Appellant,
age 65" language might be deemed to mean
v.
the decree had "specifically provide[d] other- Mark K. BOYLE,
wise" and required alimony be paid until age
Defendant and Respondent.
65 regardless of whether plaintiff remarried. Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Bench.
Taking an appeal to obtain clarification and
• eassurance on that point is clearly overkill. No. 860004-CA
Plaintiff immediately conceded that under the FILED: April 15, 1987
statute alimony would of course terminate
before age 65 should the plaintiff remarry or
take on a male roommate. Timely objection THIRD DISTRICT
to the phraseology of the decree, motion for Hon. Scott Daniels
clarification, or even a letter to opposing ATTORNEYS:
counsel would have readily elicited all the Bruce E. Coke, Larry A. Kirkham for
comfort defendant desired on this score. And
Plaintiff and Appellant.
as the majority points out, the continuing Paul H. Liapis, Kent M. Kasting for
jurisdiction provision of 830-3-5(3) preclDefendant and Respondent.
udes the conclusion that, even absent remarriage or cohabitation, defendant would be
OPINION
obligated to keep paying alimony until his exwife reached age 65 regardless of changes in GREENWOOD, Judge:
the parties' circumstances.
Plaintiff appeals from a Decree of Divorce
It is the third issue which, in my judgment, which distributed' property and debts between
keeps defendant's appeal outside the realm of the parties, cancelled pre-marital note execfrivoiousness. When a residence is a major uted by defendant in favor of plaintiff, denied
marital asset, it has become quite common to plaintiff alimony, and;granted a divorce to
order it sold and the net proceeds divided. both parties.
When the needs of the parties or their children
.The parties married in* 1974M*henvplairuiff
require, it is equally common to defer the time was 56 years Old and defendant 63. Both hail
of sale. In' the-latter situation, however, and prior marriages/ They separated in 1981 and
For compkte Utah Coda AoMXitiom,"Dotal* Code*Go's Annotation Service
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native, to remand the matter with instructions current value due to defendant's failure to
to the trial court to enter specific findings of keep records, did present some evidence of
fact.
defendant's mismanagement and large expeThe Utah Supreme Court decision in Jones nditures of corporate funds. In its findings,
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), which the trial court expressed concern that defenwas followed by this Court in Boyle v. Boyle, dant had failed to fully disclose the
735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987), is controlling company's true value.
in the instant case. In Jones, the findings of
Assets are usually valued at the time of the
the trial court merely described the property divorce decree. Berger v Bcrger, 713 P.2d
awarded to each party and failed to assign any 695, 697 (Utah 1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615
specific or cumulative values. The Utah P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980) However, where
Supreme Court held although the trial court one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its
has a broad latitude of discretion in orders value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the
concerning property distribution, "the trial trial court may, under its broad discretion,
court must exercise its discretion in accordance value the property at an earlier date, i.e.,
with the standards that have been set by this separation. In re Marriage of Priddis, 132 Cal.
Court/ Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074. One of those App. 3d 349, 183 Cal. Rptr. 37, 39 (1982); In
standards is the 'findings of fact must include re Marriage of Stallcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294,
valuation of assets in order to permit appellate 158 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1979). In view of the
review. * Boyle, 735 P.2d at 671.
j evidence adduced at trial, the trial court might
The Jones Court attempted to compensate j therefore value Diana, Inc. as of the time the
for the lack of findings by reviewing the parties separated in November, 1983.
record for evidence of the values. However,
Remanded. No costs awarded.
the Court noted such "examination reveals
Russell W. Bench, Judge
that the valuation of the most important assets
was hotly disputed by the parties. If the trial WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
court accepted one set of values, the wife was
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
clearly awarded too little; if another set was
adopted, it is possible that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion." Jones, 700 P.2d at 1. Defendant blamed the drastic reduction of value
on recent repossessions and theft of most of his
1074.
In Jones and Boyle, the Utah Supreme company vehicles and equipment, resulting in the
Court and this Court both ruled that despite loss of all major contracts.
the requirement of specific findings, the appellants in both cases waived their claims since
they were the parties who prepared the original findings. Failing to prepare the findings to
Cite as
61 Utah Adv. Rep. 31
include values, they therefore waived challenges on appeal. In the instant case, respondent
IN THE
plaintiff, not appellant defendant, prepared
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
the findings. Therefore, the Jones exception
does not apply.
In the instant case, as in Jones, the valua- Donna S. TALLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
tion of the most important assets is hotly
v.
disputed. If the trial court accepted one set of
values, defendant was clearly awarded too Glenn E. TALLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
little; if another set was adopted, the division
could be equitable. Without specific findings Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Orme.
of the values, we are unable to determine
whether the trial court distributed the property No. 860085-CA
equitably. We therefore remand for findings FILED: July 2, 1987
on the specific values of the assets.
On remand, one of the key assets to be SECOND DISTRICT
valued is Diana, Inc., the family business Hon. Rodney S. Page
awarded to defendant. At trial, both parties
testified the amount of money earned by and ATTORNEYS:
deposited into the account of Diana, Inc. Stephen A. VanDyke for Respondent.
during 1983 was approximately $750,000.00 to Paul H. Liapis, Kent M. Kasting for
$1,000,000.00. At about the time the parties
Appellant.
separated, defendant closed ail the corporate
accounts and thereafter ceased all record
OPINION
keeping. Defendant ^ f i e d ^ t ^ .aJthough
Diana, Inc. was once a profitable business, at BENCH, Judge:
the ..time of trial, it had anetworth of negaj.
Defendant appeals the property division,
tive $50,400.00.1Plaintiff, unable to show alimony award, and attorney fees award in a
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code*Co*s Annotation Service
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decree of divorce. We affirm the property support. Id.; see also Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d
division and the award of alimony, but we 669 (Utah App. 1987).
reverse the award of attorney fees.
In the instant case, the parties were married
Plaintiff Donna S. Tailey and defendant for fifteen years. At the time of the divorce,
Glenn E. Tailey were married on June 14, plaintiff netted approximately $953.00 per
1968. On December 14, 1983, plaintiff filed a month from her employment, while defendant
complaint for divorce.
earned approximately $2,018.00 net per
At trial on August 27, 1984, the court rec- month. Plaintiff testified her monthly expenses
eived evidence in the form of testimony and totaled $1,320.00. She asked for $500,00 per
exhibits regarding the value of the marital month permanent alimony. The court awarded
assets, alimony, and attorney fees. The court her $250.00 per month for the first two years
issued a memorandum of decision on Septe- and $150.00 per month for the following three
mber 4, 1984. In its decision the court assi- years. The record is clear the court considered
gned values and distributed the marital prop- the required factors, and we therefore affirm
erty by awarding plaintiff, among other items, the award of alimony.
the parties* home, her personal property, and
Defendant finally argues the trial court's
a portion of the furniture and fixtures in the award of plaintiffs attorney fees was in error
home. The court awarded defendant, among as the court failed to address the reasonableother items, a boat, various stock, his retire- ness of the fees requested by plaintiffs
ment plan, his personal property, and a counsel.
portion of the furniture and fixtures, in the
"In divorce cases, an award of attorney fees
home. The court also awarded alimony and must be supported by evidence that it is reasattorney fees to plaintiff. The court filed its onable in amount and reasonably needed by
formal findings, conclusions and decree on the party requesting the award." Huck v.
November 14,1984.
Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). AlthOn appeal, defendant contends the trial ough plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated reascourt erred in disproportionately assigning onable financial need, she failed to present
values to marital assets with insufficient evi- evidence of the reasonableness of the fee requested. At the close of plaintiffs case, her
dence.
Determining and assigning values to marital counsel proffered testimony and produced an
property is a matter for the trial court, and exhibit itemizing the time' and costs expended
this Court will not disturb those determinat- by him, his associate, and his clerk, and the
ions absent a showing of clear abuse of disc- hourly rates charged for each. Conspicuously
retion. Ycldcrman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 absent is any evidence "regarding the necessity
(Utah 1983); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 of the number of hours dedicated, the reaso(Utah 1982). While defendant has concededly nableness of the rate charged in light of the
shown that the trial court valued certain items difficulty of the case and the result accompliof marital property either contrary to or in the shed, and the rates commonly charged for
absence of his testimony, he has failed to divorce actions in the community ..." Kerr v.
show how this constitutes an abuse of discre- Kerr, 610P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980).
tion. We therefore affirm the disposition of
Because plaintiff failed in her burden of
the marital property.
establishing the reasonableness of the attorney
Defendant next argues the trial court erred fees requested, we reverse the award of attoin awarding alimony to plaintiff. Defendant rney fees. Beads v. Bcals, 682 P.2d.862 (Utah
argues the testimony and evidence at trial 1984); Delatore v. Delators 680 P.2d 27 (Utah
failed to demonstrate plaintiffs actual need 1984).
for alimony.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part. Parties
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the to bear their own costs.
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as
Russell W. Bench, Judge
possible the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from, WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Juage
becoming a public charge*. Eames v. Eames,
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Paffel v. Paffcl, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah
1986)). This Court will not interfere with an
award of alimony absent a showing of a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id.
In Eames, this Court reiterated the three
factors, previously adopted by the Utah
Supreme .Court, that ,the trial court musj:
consider in Warding; alimony; 1) jth^finanaal
condition and needs o f the receiving spouse, 2)
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a
sufficient income for himself or herself,'and 3)
the ability of the,paying spouse to provide
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service
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